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ARTICLES

WHAT IS BAYESIANISM?
A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED*
D. H. Kaye**

ABSTRACT
Bayes' Theorem, Bayesian statistics and Bayesian inference have been the subject
of sharpdispute in various writings about legal rules of evidence andproof This article
disentanglesthe many meanings of' "Bayesianism." It sketches several competing interpretationsofprobability,some leadingschools ofstatisticalinference, and the elements
of Bayesian decision theory. In the process, it notes the aspects of Bayesian theory that
have been applied in studies offorensic proof
Thomas Jefferson once remarked that "[m]athematical reasonings and
deductions are . . . a fine preparation for investigating the abstruse speculations of the law. '"' Perhaps they are, but few lawyers have tried to use mathematics or logic not merely as propaedeutics for the study of law, but as tools
for explicating or criticizing legal doctrine. Yet, a growing body of literature
on the dry and dusty law of evidence stands out as an exception to this generalization. Evidence scholars, looking to studies in allied fields like philosophy, psychology, logic and statistics, have begun to apply general theories of
inference and proof to the legal system. This "new evidence scholarship" 2
discusses mathematical formulations of such matters as the probative value of
courtroom evidence and the burden of persuasion, and it asks which such formulations (if any) best further our understanding of the rules of evidence and
*©1987D. H. Kaye. All Rights Reserved. This article was prepared as an introductory chapter
for the forthcoming book of the D. Reidel Publishing Company, PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM, (P. Tillers and E. Green ed.)
**Professor of Law, Arizona State University, Tempe AZ 85287. I am grateful to Stephen
Fienberg and Brian Skyrms for reading a draft of this paper.
'1 H. RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 53 (1858) (Letter to Bernard Moore, ca.
1765).
2This phrase is taken from Richard 0. Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship:Analyzing the
Processof Proof,66 B.U. L. REV. 439 (1986).
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how jurors or jurists should apply these rules.3 Many of the new evidence
scholars invoke the name of "Bayes," and many march to academic battle
under a "Bayesian" oriflamme.
Why Bayes? Not the name, of course, for that is accidental. If the theorem
published in 1763 that bears the name of Thomas Bayes had been attributed to
another author, it would have make no difference to the dissenting Reverend
Bayes, who was already dead and buried. Neither would it have made a difference to us. Indeed, the question of who really discovered Bayes' theorem is not
free from doubt. 4 But why have scholars of the law begun to speak of
"Bayesianism"--whatever that may be?
In Anglo-American legal systems, trials are contests in which each side
tells a story through the testimony of witnesses and other evidence. Counsel
tend to structure these stories so that under the governing substantive law,
they produce the legal consequences that their clients prefer. To this extent,
trials are exercises in the confirmation and refutation of historical theories,
much like scientific experiments are exercises in the confirmation or refutation of scientific theories. Inasmuch as some philosophers have found Bayes'
theorem helpful in explicating the concepts of evidence and proof in science,'
it is hardly surprising that some legal scholars would turn to the same source
for inspiration. Trials also bear a superficial resemblance to the testing of
statistical hypotheses, an analogy that some statisticians have exploited in
discussing hypothesis testing.6 Here too, Bayesian methods have been prominent.'
In short, the scholars of the law of evidence are hardly writing on a blank
slate. To appreciate the appeal and limits of Bayesian ideas in evidence scholarship, one needs to understand what Bayes' theorem is, how it has matured into a
school of statistical inference, and how it has provided a conceptual framework
for understanding aspects of scientific inference. Although it may be foolhardy
to attempt a brief description of all these facets of "Bayesianism," two possible
prizes make this task worth trying. First, such a discussion may sharpen a few
easily blurred distinctions for the segment of the legal community that is beginning to burrow more deeply into "Bayesianism" and its alternatives. In this
3

See generally Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L.

REV.

4

377 (1986).

See Stigler, Who Discovered Bayes Theorem? 37 AM. STATISTICIAN 290 (1983) (estimating
3:1 odds that Nicholas Saunderson rather than Thomas Bayes penned the posthumously published
essay). In any case, "Bayesian" concepts were ripe for discovery in the 18th Century. See Stigler,
Laplace's 1774 Memoir on Inverse Probability, 1 STATISTICAL Sci. 359 (1986).
5
See, e.g., P. HORWICH, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE (1982); W. SALMON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE (1967); B. SKYRMS, CASUAL NECESSITY: A PRAGMATIC INVESTIGATION OF THE NECESSITY OF LAWS (1980).
6
Neyman & Pearson, On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of StatisticalHypotheses, 231
PHIL. TRANS. Roy. Soc. 289 (1933); I. GOOD, GOOD THINKING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 11-12 (1983); Feinberg, Teaching the Type land Type II Errors:
The JudicialProcess, 25 AM. STATISTICIAN, June 1971, at 30.
7See, e.g., G. Box & G. TIAO, BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1973); Roberts, Bayesian Inference, 1 INT'L ENC. STATISTICS 9, 15 (W. Kruskal & J. Tanur ed. 1978).
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regard, the major distinctions or controversies that one would do well to keep in
mind include Bayesian versus other interpretations of probability, Bayesian
versus other theories of statistical inference, and Bayesian versus other theories
of inference generally. Second, a short explanation of the "Bayesian" approaches may serve as a vehicle for identifying the legal issues for philosophers, statisticians, psychologists, logicians and others who are well acquainted with Bayesian ideas generally and are curious about the influence that
these ideas have had on theories of forensic proof.
I. THEORIES OF PROBABILITY
The concept of probability is an unusually slippery and puzzling
one.-J.L. Mackie'
[N]early every adult speaker of English can use the word "probable"
correctly. -Ian Hacking 9
Day in and day out, attorneys, judges, jurors and witnesses speak of probabilities. No, the jury decides, it is not very likely that the fashionable physician
murdered his elderly patients to expedite his receipt of their legacies. Yes, the
prosecutor insists, the senator must have known that the cash contribution he
accepted was the gift of a foreign national. No, the expert witness testifies,
chances are that the plane crash that left the plaintiff a penniless widow was the
result not of pilot error but of an unexpected summer squall.
Is there any connection between these informal probabilities and the probabilities that mathematicians and statisticians manipulate or apply? The legal
scholarship presents divergent views on this fundamental question. To evaluate
these views, a clear conception of mathematical probability and its interpretations is imperative. The topic could fill volumes. Indeed, it already has. Still,
setting a few more remarks adrift in this sea of verbiage can do no noticeable
harm. In any case, I shall delineate seven types or theories of probability and
indicate which ones arguably apply to proof in the courtroom.'°

8J. MACKIE, TRUTH, PROBABILITY AND PARADOX: STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL

LoGIc 154

(1973).
9

HACKING, LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE

227 (1965).

typology is not exhaustive, and itcontains several overlapping categories whose boundaries are not crystal clear. Furthermore, as always, there ismore than one way to slice a salami. For
l0This

other categorizations, see, e.g., V. BARNETT, COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE 64-95 (2d
ed. 1982); T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUNDATIONS (1973); I.
Good, supra note 6, at 70-71; J. Mackie, supra note 8, at 154-88; B. SKyRMS, CHOICE AND
CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC 129, 205-15 (3d ed. 1986). I should acknowl-

edge also that my assessments of the theories that I discuss are at least mildly opinionated and are
not universally accepted.
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A. Seven Types of Probability
Mathematical Probability. From the standpoint of pure mathematics,
"there is no problem about probability: it is simply a non-negative, additive set
function, whose maximum value is unity."" Mathematical probability obeys
the many rules latent in this slightly facetious definition, and these axioms and
theorems constitute a rich formal system. Yet, "probability" in this sense is
sterile. Before we can know that this probability has anything to do with legal
evidence, we must find some connection between the abstract probability that
satisfies the mathematical stipulations and the "probability" that is spoken of
in judicial opinions or lawyers' arguments. Mathematical probability is but an
uninterpreted term in a powerful formalism.
Informal Probability.One way to transform "probability" into a term
with a clear application to forensic proof is to argue that mathematical probability is a quantitative measure of the strength of a person's belief about the
truth of propositions. John Venn, better known as an advocate of the frequentist conception of probability, appears to have resorted to this psychological
interpretation when he speculated that it might be possible to compare probabilities derived from repeated outcomes with the "amount of belief" produced by "many conflicting arguments, and many analogies more or less remote. '
Of course, most people do not wander through life quantifying the intensity of all their convictions, and there is ample reason to doubt that even if these
psychological "probabilities" were to be elicited, they would obey the rules of
mathematical probability. If these partial beliefs lack the requisite
mathemati4
cal properties, then the term "probability" is a misnomer.
ClassicalProbability. The "classical theory" of probability rests on the
principle of insufficient reason, which holds that if there are mutually exclusive
alternatives of the same form, backed by symmetrical reasons, then the proba-

"KYBURo &SMOKLER, Introduction STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 3, 4 (H. Kyburg &
H. Smokler
2d ed. 1980).
'2 Venn wrote that "these proofs themselves may have mostly faded from my mind, but they
will leave their effect behind them in a weak or strong conviction. At the time, therefore, I may still
be able to say, with some degree of accuracy, though a very slight degree, what amount of belief I
entertain upon the subject." J. VENN, THE LOGIC OF CHANCE, ch. 6 (1888), reprinted as The
Subjective Side of Probability, in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 43 (H. Kyburg & H.
Smolder ed. 1964.) Venn illustrated his suggestion with a forensic example. He wrote that one
might compare the probability that a letter has been lost in the Post Office (which experience shows
to be one in a million) to the probability that his servant stole the letter (which introspection might
show to be greater than one in a million).
3
See, e.g., D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); R. Nisbett, D. Krantz, D. Jepson & Z. Kunda, The Use ofStatistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCH. REV. 339 (1983).
4
Such an ill-mannered set of partial beliefs "hardly deserves to be called a probability." I.
Good, supra note 6, at 70. But cf L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (distinguishing between "Pascalian" probability, which is what I have called mathematical probability,
and "Baconian" probability, which has different mathematical properties.
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bility of each of these alternatives is equal.' 5 For example, since a coin has two
sides, and since we have no reason to favor the side designated "heads" over
the one designated "tails," the a priori probability that the outcome of a coin
toss will be heads is one-half. Difficulties in framing such alternatives uniquely
and in establishing the symmetrical quality of the reasons make this interpretation all but untenable. 16
FrequentistProbability. The frequency theory identifies probability with
some suitably defined relative frequency or a limiting value of such a frequency. One might say that the probability that a coin will turn up heads is the
proportion of heads that would be observed in the limit, or in the long run. This
interpretation is appealing in some domains, but it does not recognize probability as applied to unique events (except in a contrived and unfalsifiable way).' 7
Since the events in dispute in most litigation are not subject to repetition, the
theory has limited applicability in law. 8
Logical Probability.The logical theory treats probabilities as expressing
the degree of certainty that a particular body of evidence gives to the hypothesis
in question.' 9 For a deductively valid argument the probability of a conclusion
conditioned on the premises is one. The premises E of an argument in inductive
logic support the conclusion H to a lesser extent, and the inductive probability
Pr(H IE) is a numerical statement of the degree of support.
The logical relation theory of probability, with its insistence that the probability of a hypothesis H must be judged in relation to some body of evidence E,
is congenial to jurisprudential applications. It appears to be employed at least
implicitly in the discussions of legal theorists.
PersonalProbability.Informal probability, I suggested, was not a valid
interpretation of"probability" because the degrees of belief that you and I hold
do not conform to the mathematical theory of probability. However, if we view
these informal probabilities as crude or typically error-prone approximations
to a system of partial beliefs that does adhere to the probability calculus, the
notion of personal, or subjective probability emerges.' °
15For a concise summary of the origins of the classical theory, see Black, Probability, 6 ENC.
PHIL. 464, 474 (P. Edwards ed. 1968).
16But cf R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1962); H. JEFFREYS,
THEORY OF PROBABILITY (3d ed. 1967).
17Butcf W. SALMON, supra note 5, at 93 (relating a frequentist probability that does not apply

to individual events to a "weight" that does).
'8In some kinds of cases, a long run frequency may be the subject of proof. E.g., Mapes Casino, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 290 F. Supp. 186 (D. Nev. 1968); Kaye, StatisticalEvidence
of Discriminationin Jury Selection, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
13-32 (D. Kaye & M. Aickin ed. 1986).
'gThe theory has strong roots in the classical interpretation. Leading formulations of logical
relation theory are found in J. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921), H. JEFFREYS, THEORY OF PROBABILITY (3d ed. 1961), and R. CARNAP, supra note 16.
20The writings of Leonard J. Savage and Bruno de Finetti have been influential in advocating

and defending the personalist perspective. See L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS
(1954); 1 & 2 B. DE FINETTI, THEORY OF PROBABILITY (1974, 1975). See also the
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There are quite a few variations on personal probability theory. 2' At a minimum, this school of thought insists that partial beliefs be assigned to propositions "coherently." This much is needed to ensure not just any logically consistent set of partial beliefs, but a pattern that can serve as a bona fide
interpretation of mathematical probability. "Coherence" is a technical term
describing the completeness and structure of preferences. Given some seemingly innocuous postulates (like transitivity and irreflexivity) concerning preferences, it can be shown that partial beliefs satisfy all the rules of mathematical
probability .22
Although by no means essential to establishing the requirement of coherence, an analysis of betting quotients for gambling commonly is used to define
or motivate the constraints. Unless a bookie establishes his betting quotients
coherently, a clever bettor can engage the bookie in a set of bets, such that even
though the bookie judges each bet fair or favorable, he is bound to suffer a loss
overall. 23 Whether this so-called Dutch book argument for coherence is compelling in the jurisprudential context has been the subject of much drum beating
and teeth gnashing.24
PropensityTheory. The last theory of probability that I shall mention treats
probability as a characteristic of an object or a set of observational conditions.
For instance, the probability that an atom of radium will emit an alpha particle
in the next ten minutes is said to be an "objective chance" that applies to the
single atom and does not vary with the observer's personal knowledge of nu-

pathbreaking essay, RAMSEY, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS, 156 (R. Braithwaite ed. 1931), reprinted in H. E. KYBURG & H.E. SMOKLER, supra
note 11, at 23. Less formal treatments of subjective probability date back to J. BERNOULLI, ARS
CONJECTANDI (Basel 1713).
21
See, e.g., I. Good, supra note 4, at 20 ("Some attacks and defenses of the Bayesian position
assume that it is unique so it should be helpful to point out that there are at least 46656 different
interpretations. "). Thus, it may be valuable to distinguish between a subjective theory that rejects
the existence of objective chance and a personalist theory that views at least some personal probabilities as estimates of a more objective quantity. See D. MELLOR, THE MATTER OF CHANCE 2
(1971). See also P. HORWICH, supra note 5, at 32 (describing "a rationalist interpretation" in
which "an attribution of probability to a statement ... makes an objective claim to the effect that it
to believe, to the specified degree, that the statement is true").
is reasonable
22
Actually, the "representation theorems" to this effect establish the existence of both a probability and a utility function such that an individual who is coherent acts to maximize expected utility. See P. FISHBURN, The Axioms of Subjective Probability, 1 STATISTICAL SCI. 335 (1986) for a
brief survey of this work. Because of the powerful link between subjective probability and cardinal
utility and the mandate to maximize expected utility, the personalist interpretation also is called a
normative theory of subjective expected utility. See, e.g., G. Shafer, Savage Revisited,
1 STATISTICAL Sci.
23

463 (1986).

For proofs, see the papers cited in Skyrms, Dynamic Coherence, in FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 233 (I. MacNeill & G. Umphrey ed. 1987).
24
L. Jonathan Cohen and R. Lea Brilmayer (with Lewis Kornhauser) have contributed the
most powerful attacks. For an early reply to their views on the implausibility of the betting metaphor,25see Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979).
Cf Pollack, The Paradox of the Preface, 53 PHIL. ScI. 246, 247 (1986) (using the phrase
"nomic probability" for "the kind of probability involved in statistical laws of nature").
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clear physics.26 The nature of chance is a perplexing metaphysical topic, 2 and
the necessity of relying on the propensity interpretation in certain forensic applications has been debated.
B. Cross-links and "Bayesianism"
This seven-fold taxonomy is more convenient than conceptually elegant.
Mathematical probability, we saw, is a name for a measure that has particular
properties. With varying degrees of success, the other six theories seek to interpret the mathematical formalism, but they are not as neatly compartmentalized
as my cursory outline may have suggested. Thus, a propensity theorist may
maintain that personal probability is fine as far as it goes, but that there are
further empirical constraints of rationality on partial beliefs.59 A devotee of the
logical school may contend that in addition to the inductive probability that applies to inductive arguments and that measures the degree of rational support
that the premises give to the conclusion, there is an epistemic probability
Pr(H), which measures the degree of rational belief in a proposition H, which
may vary with the available stock of knowledge that a person happens to have,
and which may change over time. 3° Even a personalist may adopt the view that
in appropriate situations, limiting relative frequency determines the personal
probability. 3' The fact that the minimum constraint on personal probability is
coherence does not imply that it is the only requirement for a jurisprudentially
useful probability.32
Given the cross-connectivity among the various theories of probability, it
is not easy to say what "Bayesian probability" is.33 Usually, the adjective is
used as a synonym for the personalist, or subjective interpretation. However,
since personal probability can be conceived of either as an overarching theory
that includes other theories or as an element of certain other theories, proponents and critics of "Bayesian probability" should specify which features of
26

D. MELLOR, supra note 21, at xi.

MACKIE, supra note 8, at 179-87.
Cohen, Subjective Probabilityandthe Paradoxof the Gatecrasher,1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 627,
633-34; Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr.
Cohen's
Reply, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 635, 644-45.
29
27J.

28

D. MELLOR, supra note 21, at xii.
B. SKYRMS, supra note 10, at 18-19. Expressing changes in partial beliefs resulting from the
acquisition of new evidence and dealing with the problem of conditioning on uncertain evidence
leads to the growing body of literature on probability kinematics and Jeffrey's rule. See R. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION (2d ed. 1983). I have seen no discussions of Jeffrey's rule in the
legal literature.
3
'B. SKYRMS, supra note 10, at 214.
32
Cf R. JEFFREY, DraculaMeets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. PartialBelief, in INDUCTION, ACCEPTANCE AND RATIONAL BELIEF 157, 165, 177 (M. Swain ed. 1970) (coherence is a necessary but
far from a sufficient condition for rationality); P. HoRwicH, supra note 5, at 33 (characterizing this
view as "strong rationalism").
33
Thus, for Shafer and Tversky the frequency, propensity and betting interpretations are
merely separate manifestations of "Bayesian semantics." Shafer & Tversky, Languagesand Designs for ProbabilityJudgment, 9 COGNITIVE Sci. 309, 316 (1985). Isaac Levi, who main30
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this type of probability they find attractive or odious 3. While this attention to
detail will not settle any arguments, it at least should clarify the crux of the
disagreement.

II. THEORIES OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE
Ideally, we would like a method of inference which would allow us to
compare, on some scale, the merits of different possible parameter values,
or of simple rival hypotheses.-A.W.F. Edwards35
In addition to toying with phrases like "Bayesian probability" and "Bayesian distributions," the new evidence scholars speak of "Bayesian inference." This expression does have a fairly settled meaning in statistics, and an
exposition of this type of inference may illuminate the legal discussions. By
way of proem, I begin with a thumbnail sketch of the classical approach to such
inference. I contrast this to Bayesian inference and mention what theory or theories of probability Bayesian inference necessitates.

A. Classical Inference
A problem in statistical inference begins with data. There are two or
more probability distributions that may have generated the data, and the
problem is to make inferences about the unknown distribution. Consider the
following illustration. 3 The Woozy Manufacturing Company (WOOZYMAN) uses a machine to produce some kind of electronic component, called
tains that probability judgments ("credal states") often are indeterminate, uses a convex set of
probability functions to model this indeterminacy. I. LEVI, THE ENTERPRISE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN
ESSAY ON KNOWLEDGE, CREDAL PROBABILITY, AND CHANCE (1980). The resulting theory has
been called "broadly Bayesian" although it "departs from Bayesian orthodoxy in several respects."
Maher, Book Review, 51 PHIL. SCI. 690, 691 (1984).
34
Cf. Bartlett, Discussion on Professor Pratt's Paper, 27 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y
(SERIES B) 192, 197 (1965) ("Bayesians should also take care to distinguish their various denominations of Bayesian Epistemologist, Bayesian Orthodox, and Bayesian Savages. ").
35A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD 2 (1972).
36
For brevity, I ignore less dominant but competing theories such as fiducial probability and
likelihood. On the former, see T. SEIDENFELD, PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE: LEARNING FROM R.A. FISHER (1979). On the latter, see A.W.F. EDWARDS, supra note 35. 1
ignore also the Shafer-Dempster theory of belief functions that has been advanced as an alternative
to conventional theories of inference. See G. SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE
(1976); Shafer, Lindley's Paradox,77 J. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N 325 (1982); Dempster, A Generalizationof Bayesian Inference, 30 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y (SERIES B) 205 (1968); Krantz &
Miyamoto, Priorsand Likelihood Ratios as Evidence, 78 J. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N 418 (1983).
This theory has been mentioned in the legal literature, but, perhaps owing to its complexity, no
serious use of it has been made there. Cf Fienberg & Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentationof StatisticalEvidence and LegalDecisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771,
790-91 (1986) (questioning the usefulness of belief functions). For discussions of the various approaches for handling indeterminacy and imprecision in subjective probability, see the commentary following Fishburg, supra note 22, as well as Levi, Imprecision and Indeterminacyin Probability Judgment, 52 PHIL. ScI. 390 (1985).
37
Adapted from V. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 28-53.
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a woozy. This machine makes woozies in big batches, and it has a fixed probability of producing a defective woozy each time it makes one. Suppose that
we draw at random and test n = 200 woozies from each batch. The resulting
data may be summarized by the numbers of defective woozies for the samples. Suppose, for instance, that there were xi = 60 defectives for the ith
sample, and that we wish to draw some inference about the proportion of defectives e in that batch.
The number of defectives xi is an observation of a random variable whose
probability distribution is described by a function f(x In, e ,) that gives the
probability of all possible values of x for a particular n (here 200) and e (an
unknown parameter). 8The statistical problem is to make some judgment about
ei.
The classical method relies exclusively on the sample data. The proportion of defectives for the sample is x/n = 0.3. If we conclude, on the strength
of this sample statistic, that the proportion for the complete batch is around
0.3, then we are using the sample proportion as a point estimator of e i. In
classical inference, the sample proportion is considered a good estimator because it has certain properties, such as unbiasedness, consistency, or minimum variance. These properties make sense in the context of a view that sees
the sample proportion of .3 as a single instance in a postulated infinite sequence of similar samples. The sample proportion x/n, in other words, is a
value of a random variable whose probability distribution has a frequentist
interpretation.
Of course, there are fancier (and more revealing) techniques of classical
inference. Continuing to restrict ourselves to the sample data for the ith batch,
we may compute the interval estimate (.236, .364) which has a "confidence
coefficient" of 95 percent. It is easy to misconstrue this estimate as having a
.95 probability of covering the true e i. Yet, from the frequentist perspective,
there is only a hypothetical, infinite collection of various intervals, of which 95
percent cover e,. The classical analysis does not permit us to state the chance
that the present interval is one of the correct intervals. 9
Another tool of classical statistical inference is hypothesis testing. 40 Suppose that WOOZYMAN has signed a contract that obligates him to pay a penalty when the proportion of defective woozies in a batch exceeds 24 percent.
Then he may wish to institute a quality control program involving random sampling. We may designate the claim that e i :< .24 as the null hypothesis H0 and
the claim H, that e , > .24 as the alternative hypothesis. Since sample propor3

8Where the batch is very large compared to n, the formula is approximately f(x) = ,C e,'
(1--e 39)n-,. The term Cx represents the number of combinations of n things taken x at a time.
Although this point has been made time and again in the statistical literature, it is not always
appreciated fully in the legal literature. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and
the Burden of Persuasion,73 CORNELL L. REV. __
(1987) (in press).
4°For a survey of the pitfalls of classical hypothesis testing in litigation and some recommendations for improvements, see Kaye, Is ProofofStatisticalSignificanceRelevant? 61 WAS14. L. REV.
1333 (1986).
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tions xIn greatly in excess of .24 seem inconsistent with the claim that e <
.24, we say that we will reject H0 if and only if the sample proportion exceeds
some critical value. Classical statistics offers procedures for choosing this critical value that attend to the probability of rejecting H0 when H. is true (a false
alarm) and the probability of not rejecting H, when H, is true (a miss). For example, to keep the maximum risk of a false alarm to no more than .05, we
should find the batch unacceptable whenever the sample proportion (of size n
= 200) exceeds 0.29. Applying this rule, we would conclude that the batch we
examined, for which x,/n = .30, is unacceptable.
As with estimation, these test procedures look strictly to sample data, and
the conditional probabilities for errors do not give the chances for a mistake
with respect to any single batch. The properties of classical hypothesis tests are
framed in terms of a sequence of similar situations. Thus, the .05 level for false
alarms is an upper bound to the long-term proportion of batches satisfying the
claim of the null hypothesisthat will be rejected. Classical statistics cannot give
the probability that the rejected batch actually has an unacceptably high proportion of defectives.
B. Bayesian Inference
Where classical inference restricts itself to sample data and does not lead to
direct statements of the probability for the possible values of a parameter, Bayesian inference combines sample data with prior information to produce direct
probability statements concerning unknown parameters. To solve WOOZYMAN's problem, we treat the unknown proportion e i as the latest in a series of
batches with proportions e, e , . •., e i. If these proportions were known
(because we had exhaustively tested every previous batch 41), we might describe
them with a probability distribution 7r( e ). Suppose, for instance, that previous
values of e suggest a particular distribution 7r( e) = 0l(20,80) .2 This prior
distribution peaks at e = .194. Consequently, before turning to the sample
data on the ith proportion, we might take .194 as a prior point estimate of e i.
Now for the sample data. To simplify the notation, let me denote the sample proportion x,/n as ti. The observed value t = 0.3 seems atypical compared
to the prior distribution ?r( e ), which is centered at 0.194. One might think that
the combined information from the previous batches and the latest sample data
should yield an estimate e, somewhere between its most likely prior value of
0.194 and the sample estimate ti of 0.300.
This is what happens when one applies Bayes' rule. Bayes' rule shows us
41
If

we were limited to sample data on the prior batches, empirical Bayes' methods could be

used.42
This Beta distribution is (99!/19!79!) e '9(1 -e )79. V. BARNETT, supra note 10, graphs are
at page
43 48.
From ir ( e ), we also can see that the probability is .95 that e i lies between .128 and .283.
Thus, (. 128, .283) isa Bayesian prior confidence interval for e i.Likewise, computations based on
ir ( e ) show that the prior probability that e < .24 is .835. V. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 48.
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how to combine two ingredients-the prior distribution 7r( e ) and something
called a likelihood function-to arrive at the posterior probability density of e
given the sample data. The likelihood function I( e Iti) is computed as the probability of the given sample proportion t, as a function of e ," but it measures the
support that the statistic t lends to the possible values for e .,4Bayes' rule says
that the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood function times
the prior distribution:
7r( e Iti) a1(e Iti)r( e).46(1
In our example, multiplying the prior distribution 7r( e ) by the likelihood
function yields the posterior distribution /3(80,220). With 7r( e It,) so specified,
e is readily estimated and hypotheses about the value of e are easily tested.47
For instance, since the peak of this distribution occurs at .265, the sample proportion .3 has shifted our point estimate of the proportion of defective woozies
from the prior estimate of 0.194 to the posterior estimate of 0.265 .'
The distinctive characteristic of Bayesian statistical inference is the use of
Bayes' theorem to process the sample data in the light of previous experience. 41
In contrast to classical inference, this gives rise to posterior distributions that
permit direct statements about the probability of particular hypotheses or estimates.
When Bayes' theorem is used with random variables for which a frequentist probability distribution exists, this procedure should be unobjectionable.55
To make inferences about parameters that cannot be given a frequentist interpretation, however, we must assign probabilities in the sense of partial beliefs
to the possible values of the parameter. For this reason, a broadly applicable

44In

45

this case, the likelihood function is proportional to e ' (1-

)

-.

See, e.g., Birnbaum, Likelihood, 1 INT'L. ENC. STATISTICS 519, 520 (W. Kruskal & J.

Tanur ed. 1978).
46The proportionality constant is the reciprocal of the prior probability of the observed sample
proportion,
[j1( e I)r(e) de l.
47
For recent discussions of the relationship between inference based on such posterior distributions and classical inference, see Casella & Berger, Reconciling Bayesian and Frequentist Evidence in the One-Sided Testing Problem, 82 J. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N 106 (1987); Berger &

Selke, Testing a PointNull Hypothesis: The Irreconcilabilityof P Values and Evidence, 82 J. AM.
STATISTICAL Ass'N 112 (1987).

48The Bayesian 95 percent confidence interval moves from the prior region of (. 128, .283) to
the posterior region of (.220, .309), and the probability that e i - .24 drops from the prior value of
.835 to the posterior value of. 147. That is, the sample data has made the probability distribution
for e less diffuse and has shifted it toward higher values. V. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 48, 50.
49
Cf. Edwards, Lindman & Savage, Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research, 70 PSYCH. REV. 193, 194 (1963) ("Bayesian statistics is so named for the rather inadequate
reason
that it has many more occasions to apply Bayes' theorem than classical statistics has.").
5
°Thus, the WOOZYMAN problem was constructed so that e was a random variable whose
value e i for the ith batch we estimated from the sample observation t and the prior distribution.
Interpreting the prior and posterior distributions of e as limiting relative frequency distributions is
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theory of Bayesian inference presupposes a personal or logical interpretation of
probability. 5

C. Bayesian Inference Writ Large
The previous section described statistical inference as a process of choosing among the probability distributions that might have generated the data. The
aim of statistical inference can also be described as an effort to make meaningful statements about assertions of the form " e is in S," where e stands for a
true but unknown state of nature, and S is a subset of the possible states of nature.5 Put this abstractly, theories of statistical inference are also theories of
inductive reasoning. Bayes' rule 3 has played a large role in some theories of
inductive logic because its "conditionalization" prescription for updating
prior knowledge constitutes a rational way to assimilate new information into
one's structure of beliefs.
In this regard, Bayes' rule is usually expressed as applying to a discrete set
of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive hypotheses H, . . ., Hk. If
the prior probability of any such hypothesis Hi is Pr(H,) and the evidence for or
against this hypothesis is E, then the posterior probability is proportional 4 to
the prior probability times the likelihood of E when Hi is true:
Pr(Hi I E) ca Pr(E IHi)Pr(Hi)

(2)

According to (2), we update our belief in Hi by conditioning on the evidence E.
For any two particular hypotheses Hi and Hj, it follows that
Pr(Hi E) = Pr(E H) Pr(H)
Pr(Hj E) = Pr(EI H) Pr(H)

(3)

In other words, the posterior odds are the product of the prior odds and the
likelihood ratio LR = Pr(E IH,)/Pr(E IH). This version of Bayes' theorem has
had considerable exposure in the writings on legal evidence. The theorem has
meaningful, but carrying this interpretation over to e i is problematic. Since e i is the fixed but
unknown value for e in the current batch, it is not a random variable with a probability distribution
that can be verified by repeated observations. Cf. V. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 51. For less
equivocal examples of "objective" Bayesian inference, see id. at 193-94; G. Box & G. TIAO,
supra note 7, at 12-13.
5
'But cf. W. SALMON, supra note 5, at 128-31 (using Bayesian inference with frequentist probabilities that must be translated into the "weight" of a scientific hypothesis to model scientific
inference).
52
Mikel Aickin, How Should Statisticians Believe? An Overview of the Shafer-Dempster Approach
1 (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
53
And its generalization, Jeffrey's rule. See supra note 30.
54
The proportionality constant is [ Pr(E IHj)Pr(Hj)] -'.
j=l
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been advanced as a practical device for displaying the probative value of certain
kinds of evidence," as a heuristic device for understanding various evidentiary
doctrines,56 and as a standard against which to judge the inferential success of
real or mock jurors. 7 As in other settings, the reliance on Bayes' rule has been
challenged, and several of the papers in the present volume raise objections to
conditionalization.
III. DECISION THEORY
[A]nother type of measurement is possible in a decision problem: a measurement of utility. The two measurements, utility and probability, will
then be combined to provide a coherent solution to the problem of
decision-making under uncertainty.-D. V. Lindley"
To this point, I have tried to clarify the nature of "Bayesianism" as it pertains to interpretations of probability and to inference and induction. There is
yet a third sense in which "Bayesianism" pertains to the law of evidence. Bayesian statistical inference, we saw, takes a controversial step beyond classical
inference by incorporating prior information or beliefs. Decision theory takes
another step forward by incorporating into the analysis the consequences of
actions.
WOOZYMAN, for instance, wanted to avoid shipping a batch with an unacceptably high proportion of defective woozies. As a result, we focused on the
hypothesis H0: e _<.24. The version of classical hypothesis testing known as
Neyman-Pearson testing permits us to keep the risk of a false alarm below a
fixed level and to maximize the detection probability at the preselected level. In
practice, this level may be adjusted, somewhat subjectively, due to a recognition of the relative costs of false alarms and misses. For example, if the penalty
WOOZYMAN pays is huge compared to the cost of not shipping, then the
maximum false alarm probability will be set at a smaller level than if the costs
are roughly equal.
Decision theory makes these costs explicit and uses them along with the
prior information and the sample data to identify the optimal decision. To illustrate the basic concepts, we may consider the simplest class of decision
problems-binary decisions with a single observation. The unknown state of
nature e has only two possible values, e 0 and 0,. If e, is true but we accept
e, (call this decision d), we have a false alarm. The resulting loss is some
55

M. Finkelstein & W. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L.
489 (1970); Ellman & Kaye, Probabilitiesand Proof: Can HLA and Blood Testing Prove
Paternity?
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979).
56
E.g., R. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
57
REV.

D. FAIGMAN, BAYES' THEOREM IN THE TRIAL PROCESS: INSTRUCTING JURORS ON THE
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR (in press); THOMPSON & SCHUInterpretationof StatisticalEvidence in Criminal Trials, 11 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 167

VALUE OF PROBABILISTIC EVIDENCE,
MANN,

(1987).
58

LINDLEY, MAKING DECISIONs
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51 (2d ed. 1985).

number L(e o,d,) = A. If e, is true but we accept e,, (a miss), the loss is
L( e ,d) = B. To keep things especially simple, let us suppose that a correct
decision brings no loss and no gain. The loss table below summarizes this:
Table 1.
A particular loss function
L( e ,,dj) for a binary decision
e0

do
d,

0

B

A

0

1

A modification of the WOOZYMAN problem exemplifies this situation.
We imagine that WOOZYMAN operates a machine that has only two states. In
state e,)the machine churns out batches in which 20 percent of the woozies are
defective. In state e , the machine grinds out batches in which 30 percent of the
woozies are defective. If WOOZYMAN ships (this is decision d) a 30 percent
defective batch ( e ), he loses B dollars due to a penalty clause in his contract.
If he retains (d,) a 20 percent defective batch (e ), he loses A dollars in sales.
To obtain some information, WOOZYMAN tests one woozy from a batch. Either the randomly sampled woozy is satisfactory (x =0) or it is defective (x = 1).
Under these conditions, the probability of x depends on e in a simple way:
Pr(x=01 e 0)=.8, Pr(x- II e )=.2; Pr(x=0I e ,)=.7, Pr(x= II e ,)=.3.
We want the best decision rule 6, where 6 depends on nothing more than
the single observation of x. One conceivable decision rule would be always to
ship. Another is to ship only if the test is satisfactory (x=0). A third is to ship
only if the test indicates a defect (x = 1). A fourth is never to ship. We may label
these particular rules 6, through 6, respectively, and, in general, we may speak
of a decision rule 6(x) that tells us how to act when confronted with any sample
value x.
To assess the relative merit of such rules, decision theory relies on the expected loss, that is, the mean loss with respect to the different data that might
arise. This expected loss is known as the risk function R11(x), e j. As this notation suggests, each decision rule 6(x) has a corresponding risk function for each
possible state of nature. To determine the risk function, for every e,, we
weight the loss L[b(x), e j] that could come about by the probability of the observation x that would lead to this loss, and add these products together." For
instance, if a batch contains 30 percent defectives ( e ), then 62 will produce a

59

For a continuous random variable x,
R[&(x), e il = I Lt(x), e ilf(x Ie i)dx,
where f(x I e j) is the probability density of x for a given e j.
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loss of B dollars with probability .7 when x = 0, and no loss when x = 1;
hence, R[6 2(x), e 0] = .7B. 6°
Since the risk function is different for each unknown state of nature, it is
far from clear which decision rule is best. If e 0 applies, then the "always
ship" rule 6, minimizes the risk. But is e, holds, then the "never ship" rule
6, is optimal. To reach a decision at this point, we would have to rely on some
arbitrary criterion like the minimax principle, which instructs us to adopt the
decision rule that minimizes the maximum possible risk.6 ' Notice that so far,
nothing in our analysis is "Bayesian." The probability distribution over
which we average the losses L to obtain the risk R need not be "Bayesian,"
and we have made no use of Bayesian inference. But neither have we gotten
very far.
The Bayesian resolution of the quandary resorts to a prior distribution
7r( e,) for the states of nature. As with Bayesian inference, sometimes a frequentist interpretation of this prior distribution will be available, but in many
circumstances the argument must be that the prior distribution represents partial beliefs about the possible states of nature. Regardless of the characterization of 7r, we can order the decision rules according to the expectation of their
risks over the prior distribution of e . In short, we average the losses twicefirst over the evidence x, then over the prior information. This results in a
single number-the posterior expected loss r(6,r)-for each decision rule.
The Bayes decision rule is the one with the smallest expected posterior loss,
and this one number is called the Bayes risk. 62 The mathematical expression

6°This reasoning gives rise to the following table:
Table 2.
Risk function R[b(x), e j]
for some decision rules 6(x) for WOOZYMAN
e 0 (20 % defectives)
6,

0
APr(x

e , (30% defectives)
B
BPr(x=0

6,2
l
I e,)
.7B
0 ) = .2A
63
APr(x=0 1 e 0 ) = .8A
BPr(x=l
e,)
.3B
64
A
0
61
For a survey of other strategies, see W. BAUMOL, OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 460-475 (4th ed. 1977).
62
Applying this analysis to the WOOZYMAN problem, and using pi as an abbreviation for
Pr( e j), we arrive at the following expected posterior losses for the four decision rules:
Table 3.
Expected posterior losses r(6, e j)
for some decision rules 6(x) for WOOZYMAN
6(x)
r(b,7r)
6,

i

62
63
64
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p,
A Pr(x-l=
e 0 )p0 + B Pr(x=0i e I)pI = .2Ap0 + .7BpI
A Pr(x= 0 e0)p0 + B Pr(x-l= e I)pI = .8Apo + .3Bp 1
Apo

1

for the Bayes risk can be rewritten to make the reliance on Bayes' theorem
explicit.
Having indicated the framework and normal recipe for Bayesian decision
theory (BDT), it is time to ask why the criterion of minimizing expected posterior loss has some appeal. WOOZYMAN might like it because it produces the
decision rule that, in the long run, will minimize actual losses. In law, however, this frequentist argument is unavailing. We do not relitigate the same case
over and over, drawing the evidence according to a nicely structured prior distribution. To defend broadly the expected loss minimization criterion, we must
enter the domain of utility theory. The normative treatment of preferences
mentioned in connection with personal probability leads to a derivation of (1)
personal probabilities that characterize partial beliefs, (2) cardinal utilities that
order preferences for uncertain consequences, and (3) the prescription to maximize the expected utility of decisions, using the personal probabilities to form
the expectation. This is the subjective expected utility theory of decision making.64 With the losses measured as disutilities, it yields BDT's directive to minimize expected loss.
In sum, decision theory, like Bayesian inference, is "Bayesian" to the extent that it relies on Bayes' theorem in finding the decision rule that minimizes
the expected loss. It is also "Bayesian" in that the criterion of minimizing expected loss can be defended from the standpoint of personal probability.
This Bayesian decision theory, or some less elaborate variant on it, has
proved fruitful in the study of the burden of persuasion. As with Bayesian inferIgnoring other conceivable decision rules, the Bayes risk would be the value of r in Table 2 that
turns out to be the smallest upon substituting applicable values for the losses A and B and the prior
probabilities P0 and Pt. The term "Bayes risk" also has been applied to the expected posterior loss

r(6,7r) for any 8 rather than mirnr(6,7r). G.

BEAUMONT,

INTERMEDIATE MATHEMATICAL STATIS-

66 (1980); B. LINDGREN, ELEMENTS OF DECISION THEORY 124 (1971).
63
The expected posterior loss is
r(b,7r) = I R(6, e)3r(e )de = l{l L[b(x), e ]f(xI e )dx}r(e)d e.
See supra note 51. Substituting the likelihood function 1( e Ix) for f(x I e ) and rearranging, we
have
Tics

r(b,r) a I de

L[6(x),E)

]le

Ix)Tr(e)dx.

But since Bayes rule (1) states that 1( e 1x)ir( e ) cer( e Ix),
r(b,7r) a I d e I L[b(x), e ]ir(e Ix)dx.
Reversing the order of integration, we conclude
r(b,7r) c I dx I L[b(x), e ]7r(e Ix)de.
For a similar derivation for discrete states and actions, see B. LINDGREN, supra note 62, at 124.
This reformulation shows why the expectation of the risk R(6, e ) over the prior distribution
7r( e ) may be called the expected posterior loss. It is essentially the loss function averaged over the
posterior distribution ir( e 1x), then averaged over the different data that might arise.
To find the rule that keeps r(6,ir) to a minimum, we need merely find the 6 that minimizes the
interior integral. This approach, which avoids the averaging over potential data, can be both computationally and conceptually advantageous. See V. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 255-56 (describing this "extensive form" of analysis that leads to the Bayes' decision rule in relation to the current
data alone).
64See supranote 22. For discussions from the perspective of economic theory, see Marschak,

Decision Making: Economic Aspects, 1 INT'L ENC.
1978); W. BAUMOL, supra note 61.
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ence, its usefulness in describing the decision-making of jurors and mock jurors has been the subject of many empirical studies.6 Likewise, many a law
review article has drawn on the power of decision theory to analyze the burden
of persuasion.' At the same time, the value of decision theory in explicating the
meaning of the burden of persuasion has been sharply questioned. 6' A panoply
of objections stem from what has come to be known, picturesquely, as the
problem of naked statistical evidence. 68 This problem, which usually comes
with a colorful wardrobe of hypothetical cases, receives more than passing attention in the recent literature. 69 And, of course, there are other concerns with
BDT as a tool for the study of rules of proof.7'
In sum, the new evidence scholars are fishing in deep waters. Something
surely is flopping about in their nets, but the catch has yet to be cleaned, prepared and served as a dish that delights every discerning palate-a true bouillaBayes.
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See, e.g., Connolly, Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of ErroneousAcquittals, 11 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 101 (1987); Dane, In Search of Reasonable Doubt: A Systematic Examination of Selected QuantificationApproaches, 9 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 141 (1985).
Martin & Schum, Quantifying Burdensof Proof: A Likelihood Ratio Approach, 27 JuRIMETRICS J.
383 (1987), presents an interesting methodological critique of the early empirical work.
66E. g., Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess,20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968).
67
See Symposium, supra note 3.
68
For example, some commentators insist that decision theory is inapposite because it does not
include a decision not to decide. While the binary decision problem restricts itself to only two decisions, BDT can accommodate decisions to gather more evidence. For instance, we could extend
the decision space in the WOOZYMAN problem to include d3-a decision to sample and test more
woozies before disposing of the batch. To my knowledge, the problem of naked statistical evidence
has yet to be approached in this formal fashion.
69
E.g., Kaye, supra note 39; Symposium, supra note 3.
70
E.g., Brilmayer, Second Order Evidence and Bayesian Probabilities,66 B.U. L. REV. 673
(1986).
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